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The theories of tax evasion and public good provision go back to several decades.1,2
These are the two prominent factors affecting the income and expenditure side of
a government budget. Moreover, it is often argued that tax evasion and corruption
(such as embezzlement of public funds for private gain) are highly correlated.3 De-
spite the obvious link between tax evasion, embezzlement and public good provision,
there seem to have been an oversight in connecting these three different strands of
literature. This paper attempts to remedy this neglect by providing a simple the-
oretical model connecting these three factors and providing insights on how they
are inter-linked, thereby providing ‘food for thought’ to address these important
economic issues.
Tax evasion is one of the central issues in public finance that affects developed,
developing and under-developed economies. The initial study by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) analyses the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether to evade tax
or not, given that the tax is at a fixed rate on the declared income. The decision
of a taxpayer is to choose an amount of undeclared income, in order to maximize
her expected utility. The tax authority then randomly audits some taxpayers, and
any tax-evading taxpayer is penalized. Since then the literature on tax evasion has
developed in several directions, both theoretical as well as empirical.4,5
There is a vast literature on a public good provision, which focuses on efficient
mechanisms of re-distributing public funds/goods and addressing the free-rider prob-
lem associated with it. Decentralized (or informal) sanctioning mechanism i.e. peer-
punishments, is widely studied as a medium to improve compliance in case of public
good games, see for instance, Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000, 2002). Surprisingly, less atten-
tion is given to centralized (formal) sanctions as a means of encouraging individuals
to contribute towards a public good.6
1The tax evasion literature started from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974).
2The public good literature started from Samuelson (1954). See also Foley (1970), Green,
Kohlberg, and Laffont (1976), Green and Laffont (1977), Groves and Ledyard (1977), among oth-
ers.
3See Slemrod (2007), Casaburi and Troiano (2016), Litina and Palivos (2016).
4Yitzhaki (1974) provides the first extension of the seminal model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for a more detailed review of the theoretical models in
the literature.
5See Slemrod (1985), and more recently Engstro¨m, Nordblom, Ohlsson, and Persson (2015),
Rees-Jones (2017), among others.
6See Falkinger (1995) and Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) for some initial theoretical work
on formal sanctions. In addition, see Markussen, Putterman, and Tyran (2014) and Kamei, Put-
terman, and Tyran (2015) for experimental studies on the preference of individuals for formal vs
informal sanction mechanisms.
2
The embezzlement of public funds by a public official is the simplest form of
corruption, since these funds are generated from the taxes paid by citizens, and
therefore they have to be re-distributed in the form of public goods. If there are
no strict rules, a public official has all the incentives for appropriating funds for his
personal gain.7
In this paper, we combine the important features of these three areas of literature
on tax evasion, public good provision, and embezzlement.8,9 We consider a simple
model with two citizens and a governor. First, the citizens decide whether to pay
or evade taxes. Then, Nature (or Internal Revenue Service in the USA) audits one
of the citizens, at random, and in case of non-payment, the citizen is forced to pay
the tax and an additional penalty. Third, the governor receives all citizens’ taxes
(after the audit) and decides how much of these public funds to use for the public
good provision. Finally, after the governor’s decision, citizens express their opinion
whether he steals public funds or not. Citizens can punish the governor in case
of embezzlement (for example, by filing a complaint) if they correctly guess total
amount of public funds. This guessing is a proxy for voting in favour or against the
governor.10 We present our model in the form of a four-stage extensive form game.11
Even with this very simple structure, we find some very interesting and intuitive
results. We are able to discuss wide range of possibilities using four basic parameters
of the model: a penalty parameter for the non-payment of taxes (z), a punishment
parameter for the embezzlement of funds (b), a marginal per capita return from the
public good (α), and a citizen penalty parameter for wrong guessing (c).
We analyse our four-stage extensive form game in several steps. First, we elim-
inate dominated actions. Then, we describe a normal form of this reduced game.
Finally, we characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. It turns out that any
strategy profile can be a Nash equilibrium for the right choice of parameters z, b, α,
and c.
In order to select among different Nash equilibria, we assume that citizens care
7See some interesting theoretical and empirical studies by Ades and Di Tella (1999), Brollo,
Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2013), Fisman, Schulz, and Vig (2014) discussing various incen-
tives for politicians.
8See Cowell and Gordon (1988) for a related study linking literatures on tax evasion and pub-
lic good provision.
9See Table 1 below for a snapshot of the relevant literature.
10See Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Azfar and Nelson (2007), Costas-Pe´rez, Sole´-Olle´, and
Sorribas-Navarro (2012), among others, for related experimental and empirical studies where
some form of accountability (such as elections, public information dissemination, etc.) are used
to discourage peculation of funds by public office.
11Our model has a flavor similar to that of yardstick competition. See Besley and Case (1995)
for more details.
3
about their guesses, or c > 0. This natural assumption allows to refine our predic-
tions. We get three types of Nash equilibria: tax evasion, embezzlement, and efficient
public good provision. We show that whenever the penalty for the non-payment of
taxes, z, is low, both citizens have an incentive to evade taxes. Similarly, when this
penalty, z, is high enough and the punishment for stealing of public funds, b, is rel-
atively low, at least one of the citizens pay taxes and the governor squanders public
funds, when such an opportunity arises. We also find that for the efficient public
good provision, i.e. a situation where both citizens pays taxes and the governor
re-distributes the entire public fund, values of both parameters z and b need to be
high, thereby demonstrating an inter-connection between them.
Table 1 below lists the relevant literature on tax evasion, embezzlement and
public good provision, which our model attempts to unify. A few papers tried to
link tax evasion either with public good provision or embezzlement (see Table 1
for details), but we believe that these three concepts are interrelated and should
be studied together to improve policy implications. The outline of the paper is
as follows. Section 2 describes our model and the reduced extensive form of the
game. Section 3 presents the analysis of the model that includes the main results, a
discussion of these results, and possible connections of these results with the existing
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We consider a four-stage extensive form game involving two citizens, C1 and C2, and
a governor, G. The citizens need to decide whether or not to pay taxes, given that
they may be audited and punished (in case of non payment). Nature selects one
of the citizens at random to audit. The total tax collected goes into a public fund.
After the tax payment decisions have been made by the citizens, the governor has to
decide how much of the fund to use to provide a public good. Finally citizens voice
their opinion about the governor’s decision. We formally describe the four-stage
game now.
Stage 1
Nature randomly selects to audit one of the two citizens with equal probability.
Formally, the state of nature is Θ ∈ {C1, C2} where Pr{Θ = C1} = Pr{Θ = C2} = 12
and citizen Θ is audited.
Stage 2
The choice of nature is not known to the citizens and I1i=1,2 denotes the information
sets of citizen Ci=1,2 at this stage. Ci=1,2 has to decide whether to pay taxes, ti = 1,
or not, ti = 0. We assume that the tax is 1 unit for each citizen and the total taxes
go towards a public fund. Any non-payment implies tax evasion, i.e. 0 unit paid
towards the public fund. After the citizens make their decisions, the information
about the audit is revealed. If a non tax-paying citizen is audited, he will need to
pay 1 + z, where z ≥ 0 is the sanction (penalty)12 parameter.
Stage 3
Governor G receives the total public fund X, given by:
X =
{
2, if {Θ = Ci} & {tj 6=i = 1},
1, if {Θ = Ci} & {tj 6=i = 0}.
(1)
If both citizens C1 and C2 pay taxes, the governor G will have X = 2 units, and
it doesn’t matter which citizen is audited. In a situation when both citizens C1 and
C2 evade taxes (i.e. non-payment of taxes), one of them is audited and will have to
12We assume that the entire z collected goes to the independent tax authority, Nature, to help
conduct audits, etc.
6
pay 1 unit (along with a sanction of z), implying a total contribution of X = 1 unit.
If only one of the citizens evades taxes we have X = 2 units (X = 1 unit) when
the tax-evading citizen is audited (tax-evading citizen is not audited). Formally, the
governor G has two information sets : IG = {I1G, I2G}, where
I1G = {X = 1} and I2G = {X = 2} (2)
After G receives the public fund X, he decides how much of the public good to
provide. When X = 2, the action set for G is {L,H}, where L (Low) and H (High)
represent 1 and 2 units, respectively, of the public good provided by G. When X = 1,
the governor G can only provide 1 unit, L, of the public good. We assume that G
benefits from the public good provision too. We define an embezzling G as the
governor who peculates one unit of public good when X = 2.
Stage 4
In the final stage of the game, we model a proxy for voting by incorporating a guessing
mechanism where the citizens, C1 and C2, are required to guess whether total fund,
X, is high (h) or low (l). We assume that wrong guess is costly and each citizen
wants to guess correctly. Depending on which citizen was audited in Stage 1, one of
them has more information about the possible X; we explain this below.
• If G plays H (provides 2 units of public good), each citizen has the dominant
(guess) action h.
• If G plays L (provides 1 unit of public good), each citizen Ci=1,2 has three





I2i = {(Θ = Ci, tj 6=i = 0, L), (Θ = Ci, tj 6=i = 1, L)}, (3)
I3i = {(Θ = Cj 6=i, ti = 1, L)}, (4)
and
I4i = {(Θ = Cj 6=i, ti = 0, L)}. (5)
At I2i , citizen Ci is not sure about the total public fund X and Ci’s action set is
{l, h}. At I3i , citizen Ci knows X = 2 and his dominant action is h. Similarly at I4i ,
citizen Ci knows X = 1 and his dominant action is l. For each citizen Ci=1,2, let gi
denote the guesses made by him:
7
gi ∈ {h, l} (6)
The guessing mechanism helps in representing a set-up where the citizens can
punish (file a complaint, for example) against a governor who embezzles. The only
situation this can happen is when X = 2 and the governor decides to provide 1
unit of the public good. Given that the governor embezzles, if the citizens correctly
guess the total X, G’s payoff will decrease by b ≥ 0 for every correct guess, i.e. the
governor loses confidence of his citizens. On the other hand, Ci’s payoff will decrease
by c ≥ 0 for a wrong guess. We consider α as the marginal per capita return (or
MPCR) of the public good, with α > 0. The game concludes after Stage 4.
The payoff of Ci=1,2 is a function of:
[Θ ∈ {C1, C2}; t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1}; {L,H} ; gi ∈ {h, l}] .
The payoff for G is a function of:
[Θ ∈ {C1, C2}; t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1}; {L,H} ; g1, g2 ∈ {h, l}].
Game Tree
We represent our extensive form game with a game tree. The nature starts the game
by choosing which citizen C1 or C2 to audit (with probability
1
2
). C1 and C2 do not
know who is being audited and they decide, simultaneously, whether to pay or evade
taxes. The total taxes go towards a public fund (X). After citizens have made their
moves, G receives X. G can not observe the actions of C1 and C2 from the previous
stage and has two information sets: I2G for X = 2 and I
1
G for X = 1. At I
2
G he
has two actions, either provide 2 units (H) or provide 1 unit (L) of the public good;
while at I1G his only action is L. After G has made his decision, C1 and C2 will guess
how much X was, which is the last stage of the game. When Ci is not sure about X




i ), Ci is sure that
X = 2 (X = 1), and thus has a dominant action of h (l). This gives us the reduced
form of the game tree with 20 terminal nodes and the corresponding payoffs being
summarized in Table 2.
8















































































































Table 2: Table of Payoffs
Terminal nodes C1 C2 G
T1 −1 + 2α −1 + 2α 2α
T2 −1− z + 2α −1 + 2α 2α
T3 −1 + 2α −1 + 2α 2α
T4 −1 + 2α −1− z + 2α 2α
T5 −1 + α− c −1 + α 1 + α− b
T6 −1 + α −1 + α 1 + α− 2b
T7 −1 + α α α
T8 −1 + α− c α α
T9 −1− z + α− c −1 + α 1 + α− b
T10 −1− z + α −1 + α 1 + α− 2b
T11 −1− z + α α α
T12 −1− z + α− c α α
T13 −1 + α −1 + α− c 1 + α− b
T14 −1 + α −1 + α 1 + α− 2b
T15 −1 + α −1− z + α− c 1 + α− b
T16 −1 + α −1− z + α 1 + α− 2b
T17 α −1 + α α
T18 α −1 + α− c α
T19 α −1− z + α α
T20 α −1− z + α− c α
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3 Analysis of the model
A pure strategy for a citizen (or governor) specifies a complete plan of actions, i.e. an
action for the citizen (or governor) at each information set. For each i ∈ 1, 2, the pure
strategy set for citizen Ci consists of the Cartesian product {1, 0}× {l, h}× {l, h}×
{l, h} . Similarly, the pure strategy set for governor G is given by {L,H}×{L}. Each
citizen has 4 information sets with 2 actions at each information set. Therefore, each
citizen has 24 = 16 pure strategies. The pure strategy set of citizen Ci=1,2 is Si =
{1lll, 1llh, 1lhl, . . . , 1hhh, 0lll, . . . , 0hhh}.
At information sets I3i and I
4
i , h and l are the dominant actions for Ci=1,2. Thus,
we eliminate dominated strategies and consider only a “reduced” strategy set (with
some abuse of notation) for citizen Ci=1,2 : S
′
i = {1l, 1h, 0l, 0h}, where two actions
in each strategy report choices at information sets I1i and I
2
i . The governor has only
one action at information set I1G. Thus, with some abuse of notation, we denote the
governor’s reduced strategy set as S ′G = {L,H}. The following reduced normal form
game B (see Table 3) summarizes the expected payoffs13 for all the possible outcomes
of the game.
13 An example: A strategy profile such as (1h, 0l, L) refers to citizen 1 playing 1h, citizen 2
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Table 3: Reduced normal form game, B
L
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l −1 + α− 1
2
c −1 + α− 1
2
c −1 + α −1 + α
−1 + α− 1
2
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H
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l −1 + 2α −1 + 2α −1 + 3
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α −1 + 3
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We are ready to present our first result now.
Theorem 1. For any strategy profile s∗ = (s1, s2, sG), there exist parameters z, c, α,
b such that s∗ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE, henceforth) of the reduced
normal form game B, where si=1,2 ∈ {1l, 1h, 0l, 0h} and sG ∈ {L,H}.
The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to the Appendix. We observe that any
strategy profile in the reduced normal form game B can be a PSNE and Table
4 summarizes the corresponding conditions on the parameters z, c, b, α such that
Theorem 1 holds true. Each cell in Table 4 provides the restrictions on the parameters
such that the outcome corresponding to that particular cell (from Table 3) is a
PSNE. For example, consider the outcome (0h, 1h,H) in Table 3 where C1 plays 0h,
C2 plays 1h and G chooses to play H. From Table 4, it is easy to see that when
c = 0, z = 1 − α and b ≥ 1
2
(1 − α), (0h, 1h,H) is a PSNE of the game. Our model
provides an extremely rich setting which helps us describe any possible situation
using four simple parameters. We are not aware of another model which obtains a
similar result. Given the simplicity of our model and the amplitude of this result, it
is possible to explain what conditions will result in a particular setting. For instance,
we can provide specific restrictions on the parameters which will result in a particular
scenario (such as the citizens evading taxes or the governor embezzling funds, etc.)
to exist in a society.
Theorem 1 offers us a wide range of possibilities. We now want to restrict our
discussion to some specific situations of economic interest and for the purpose of
doing so we assume some restrictions on parameter c.
13
Table 4: Conditions on parameters
L
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l c = 0, z ≥ 1 c = 0, z ≥ 1 c = 0, z = 1 c ≥ 0, z = 1
b ≤ 1− α b ≤ 2
3
(1− α) b ≤ (1− α) b ≤ 1
2
(1− α)
1h c = 0, z ≥ 1 c ≥ 0, z ≥ 1 c = 0, z = 1 c = 0, z = 1
b ≤ 2
3
(1− α) b ≤ 1
2
(1− α) b ≤ 1− α b ≤ 1
2
(1− α)
0l c = 0, z = 1 c = 0, z = 1 c ≥ 0, z ≤ 1 c = 0, z ≤ 1
b ≤ 1− α b ≤ (1− α) ————– ——–
0h c ≥ 0, z = 1 c = 0, z = 1 c = 0, z ≤ 1 c = 0, z ≤ 1
b ≤ 1
2
(1− α) b ≤ 1
2
(1− α) —————- ————
H
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l z ≥ 1− α z ≥ 1− α c ≥ 0, z = 1− α c ≥ 0, z = 1− α
b ≥ 1− α b ≥ 2
3
(1− α) b ≥ 1− α b ≥ 1
2
(1− α)
1h z ≥ 1− α z ≥ 1− α c = 0, z = 1− α c = 0, z = 1− α
b ≥ 2
3
(1− α) b ≥ 1
2
(1− α) b ≥ 1− α b ≥ 1
2
(1− a)
0l c ≥ 0, z = 1− α c = 0, z = 1− α c ≥ 0, z ≤ 1− α c = 0, z ≤ 1− α
b ≥ 1− α b ≥ 1− α —— —-
0h c ≥ 0, z = 1− α c = 0, z = 1− α c = 0, z ≤ 1− α c = 0, z ≤ 1− α
b ≥ 1
2
(1− α) b ≥ 1
2
(1− α) —- ——-
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3.1 c > 0
Assuming the citizens do care about the wrong guesses (i.e. c > 0), we discuss below
few interesting outcomes/scenarios.
Example 1. Tax evasion: Assuming z = 1
2
, we have (0l, 0l, L) as the PSNE of the
reduced normal form game14, where both citizens evade taxes and guess correctly
that the governor had one unit for public good provision and the governor provides
L level of public good. Proposition 1, below, generalizes this result.
Proposition 1. If the punishment for tax evasion is relatively small, i.e.
0 ≤ z ≤ 1 (7)
there exists at least one pure-strategy (tax evasion) Nash equilibrium where both cit-
izens evade taxes.
Given the condition in inequality (7), we have a second PS(tax evasion)NE profile
(0l, 0l, H), where both citizens evade taxes and guess correctly that the governor
had one unit for public good provision, and the governor provides two units (H)
in the information set, which is out of the equilibrium path. Our Proposition 1 is
consistent with most of the literature: if the penalty on tax evasion is small, then each
citizen has the dominant strategy to avoid paying taxes. The theoretical literature
on tax evasion15 goes back to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974).
These studies provide simple theoretical model where individual tax payers decide
whether or not to evade taxes in the presence tax enforcement (i.e. random audits,
penalties, etc.). There have been extensions to these two models in various contexts
and Sandmo (2005) provide an extensive review on the literature on tax evasion.16 A
more recent study by Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez (2011) extends
the model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and suggests that for self-reported
income the empirical results are aligned with the theoretical model17, i.e. tax evasion
is substantial and is negatively related to an increase in penalties, probability of audit,
etc. This result can also be connected to another stream of literature on sanctions
14See Tables 3 and 4 for details.
15The literature on optimal taxation starting from Mirrlees (1971), and more recently Chander
and Wilde (1998) and Bassetto and Phelan (2008), among others, provide some insights towards
tax enforcement techniques and their effects on tax evasion and avoidance.
16See also Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) for a review describing the major theoretical
and empirical findings in the tax compliance literature, focusing mainly on income tax compli-
ance.
17See also Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura (2016) for a related study.
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in case of public good games.18 Baldassarri and Grossman (2012) conducted lab-in-
the-field experiments to show that subjects significantly increase their contribution
in the presence of centralized sanctioning mechanism.
Example 2. Embezzlement: Assuming z = 2 and b = 1
4
, we have (1h, 1h, L) as
the PSNE of the reduced normal form game19, where both citizens pay their taxes
and guess correctly that the governor had two units for public good provision and
the governor provides L, i.e. the governor embezzles one unit of public good. We
generalize this result formally in the proposition below.
Proposition 2. If the punishment for tax evasion is high enough,
z ≥ 1
and the punishment for embezzlement is small enough, i.e.
0 ≤ b ≤ 1
2
(1− α),
there exists a pure-strategy (embezzlement) Nash equilibrium where at least one citi-
zen pays her taxes and the governor embezzles one unit of public good, whenever he
has an opportunity to do so.
This proposition stipulates that high punishment for tax evasion forces citizens
to pay taxes. At the same time, a small enough punishment for embezzlement
encourages the governor to steal one unit. For z = 1 (and same restriction on
b as provided by Proposition 2 above) we have (1l, 0h, L) and (0h, 1l, L) as the
PS(embezzlement)NE where only one of the citizens evades tax and the governor
embezzles when the opportunity arises (i.e. when a tax-evading citizen is audited
resulting in X = 2 for the governor to re-distribute). This result is very intuitive
and similar results20 exist in the literature which examine whether some form of
accountability (may be, electoral) could discourage peculation.
Example 3. ‘Efficient’ public good provision: Assuming α = 2
3
, z = 1
2
, b = 1
2
, we
have (1h, 1h,H) as the PSNE of the reduced normal form game, where both citizens
18There is extensive literature on peer-punishments to improve welfare and compliance for pub-
lic good games; see, for instance, Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002), Baldassarri and Grossman (2011), An-
dreoni and Gee (2012), Hilbe, Traulsen, Ro¨hl, and Milinski (2014) and Grieco, Faillo, and Zarri
(2017), among others.
19See Table 3 and Table 4 for details.
20See Welch and Hibbing (1997), Peters and Welch (1980), Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Fis-
man and Miguel (2007), Ferraz and Finan (2008), Barr, Lindelow, and Serneels (2009), Ferraz
and Finan (2011), Bobonis, Ca´mara Fuertes, and Schwabe (2016), Weitz-Shapiro and Winters
(2017), among others.
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pay their taxes and guess correctly that the governor had two units for public good
provision and the governor provides H level of public good. There can be multiple
Nash equilibria in this scenario and we formally state this result in Proposition 3
below.
Proposition 3. If the punishment for tax evasion is high enough,
z ≥ (1− α),
and the punishment for embezzlement is high enough,
b ≥ (1− α),
then there exists a pure strategy (public good provision) Nash equilibrium where at
least one citizen pays taxes and the governor re-distributes the entire public fund.
This proposition demonstrates that if both punishments for tax evasion and em-
bezzlement are high enough, then every member benefits. For z = 1 − α (and the
same restriction on b as given by Proposition 3 above), we have (0l, 1l, H), (0h, 1l, H),
(1l, 0l, H) and (1l, 0h,H) as the PS(public good provision)NEs of the game where
only one of the citizens pay taxes (i.e. an asymmetry in the behaviour of the citi-
zens21) and the governor is honest i.e. re-distributes two units of public good when
the opportunity arises (if the tax-evading citizen is audited, governor has X = 2).
To ensure an efficient public good provision, i.e. a situation where both citizens
pay taxes and the governor redistributes the entire public fund, we impose a strict
restriction on z (keeping the restriction on b same as above).
Corollary 1. For z > (1 − α), there exists a pure strategy (‘efficient’ pubic good
provision) Nash equilibrium where both citizens pay their taxes and the governor
re-distributes the entire public fund.
We assume 1
3
≤ α ≤ 1 for efficiency, and given the restrictions on z and b from
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, we have (1l, 1h,H), (1h, 1l, H), (1l, 1l, H) as the
PS(‘efficient’ public good provision)NEs of the game where both citizens pay taxes
and the governor makes high two-unit, H, public good provision and citizens guess
either l or h in this information set, which is out of the equilibrium path.
There is an extensive theoretical literature on optimal public good provision
which looks at various (punishment) mechanisms22 (see Groves and Ledyard (1977)
21See Erard and Feinstein (1994) and Gibson, Tanner, and Wagner (2013) for related literature.
22See Smith (1980) for an earlier experiment on a different type of (auction) mechanism for
public good provision.
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for details) which encourage individuals to make contributions towards the pub-
lic fund. Falkinger (1995) and Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) propose incentive
schemes where the government should reward (via subsidies) or penalize (via addi-
tional taxes) deviations from mean contribution in order to increase efficiency. Some
more recent experimental studies23 try to test the validity of the theoretical results
to find that some form of penalties does encourage contributions (or reduce tax eva-
sion). Citizens’ behaviour depends on the motivations, intentions and behaviour of
the government. Empirical evidence suggests citizens are likely to evade taxes if they
believe the government will not provide good service. Citizens will comply if the gov-
ernment reciprocates their trust (see Luttmer and Singhal (2014), Slemrod (2007)).
Casaburi and Troiano (2016) provide evidence of a positive interaction between im-
proved tax-payer monitoring systems and political incentives, i.e. there is increase in
the re-election likelihood with introduction of better auditing technologies, especially
in areas where the government is more efficient in providing public goods. One of
the closely related work is by Litina and Palivos (2016), where they model an over-
lapping generation economy with two distinct groups of agents: private citizens and
politicians in order to explain why countries fall into a vicious circle of tax evasion
and political corruption.24 They find two stable equilibria: one equilibrium is when
there is low corruption and low tax evasion and the other one is when there is high
corruption and high tax evasion.
4 Conclusion
We provide a simple unified model of tax evasion, embezzlement and public good
provision and show the links between the three. Our model provides an extremely
rich setting, where with the help of our four basic parameters we can describe any
possible situation. The amplitude of this result enables us to extend the model
in various directions (empirical, experimental and theoretical). The model and our
equilibrium predictions can be tested in a laboratory experimental setup. In addition
to this, the model can be tested in a field with support of some real data. One can
also think of how the equilibrium behaviour of the players will change when the
model is considered in a repeated setting. We postpone these ideas for future work.
23See Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992), Chen and Plott (1996), Falkinger, Fehr, Ga¨chter,
and Winter-Ember (2000) , Bracht, Figuieres, and Ratto (2008), Uler (2011), Robbett (2016),
among others.
24See DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2015), Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan (2016) for an
interesting analysis on the relation between corporate tax evasion and corruption.
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A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
For any profile to be a PSNE, strategies of players in the profile have to be mutual
best responses. Consider the strategy profile (1l, 1l, L). For C1 (similarly, C2), given
that C2 (C1) and G play 1l and L, respectively, 1l has to be the best response of C1
(C2). Given that Ci=1,2 plays 1l, L has to be the best response of G. That is, for
Ci=1,2, we have, the following:
EuCi(1l, 1l, L) ≥ EuCi(1h, 1l, L)
=⇒ −1 + α− 1
2
c ≥ −1 + α
=⇒ c ≤ 0;
EuCi(1l, 1l, L) ≥ EuCi(0h, 1l, L)







=⇒ z ≥ 1 + c; 25
and for G, we have:
EuG(1l, 1l, L) ≥ EuG(1l, 1l, H)
=⇒ 1− b+ α ≥ 2α
=⇒ b ≤ 1− α.
From the inequalities above, we have z ≥ 1, c = 0 and b ≤ 1−α as the conditions
for the strategy profile (1l, 1l, L) to be a PSNE. Analogously, we can derive the
conditions on parameters z, b, c, α required for the remaining 31 strategy profiles to
be PSNE for the reduced normal form game. In the interest of space and to avoid
repetition, we do not include the proofs here but a summary of the conditions have
been provided in Table 4. 
25Note that given this inequality, we also have EuCi(1l, 1l, L) ≥ EuCi(0l, 1l, L).
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